principles of modernity governing the Western world since the Elnlightenment, and formulated as political goals by it after the World War II. Since the new "enemy" is far less visible, monitorable and manipulable, security as a notion has become an even more integral concern of the Westcrn vvorld, especially after the expcriences in former Yugoslavia, Kuwait, Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo ete., vvhich has served to vvarn about the indivisibility of security for the proteetion of the modern concept of life. Thus, novvadays a structural incorporation to a (mainly Western) vvorld rapidly moving tovvard an organic integration, functionally means taking active part in the shaping of the "better" vvorld; being able to determine the core values of global security in the near future. The irıner core of global security in the near future is likely to be based oın a vvorld that is predietable, controllable, manageable and therefore safe and free, i.e., vvhere no setbacks on the rule of modern democracy and economic liberalism are necessary or telerated. 1 It is probably an overt signal of this holistic aspect of security at one vvith economic interests taking shape in an integrating vvorld vvhich led President Bili Clinton to declare that economic security is at the top of the international agenda. This basic principlc vvill probably constitute the context of the emerging relationship betvveen Turkey and the USA, as Turkey evolves from strategic security partner to trade partner.
Historically, America's interest in Turkey began vvith economic motivations at the turn of the century, vvhen, little after his inauguration as President, Thcodore Roosevelt said for vvorld domination, the United States had to overeome Turkey and Spain vvho "held the keys".
2 Indeed, the U.S. regarded Turkey as an object of its "open door" policy during the so-called term of "isolationism". Hovvever, after World War II, the relationship vvas based mainly on a problematic of military security, economic ^urcu Bostanoğlu and Galip İsen, "Impossibility of Long Term Instability in the Northeastern Mediterranean", Middle Eastern Journal of International Affairs, 1998, pp. 3-4. relations being relegated to a unilateral flow of aid which, as in the case of Cyprus, were dangled över Turkey's head to influence Ankara's policies. During the Cold War period and within the context of the previous concept of security, the overall role of Turkey vvas little more than that of a sentinel. It's contribution amounted to it's geostrategical position astride the southward passage of the Soviets, in return for a guarantee of territorial integrity. Comfortable in that security calculus, Turkey hardly bothered to improve economic ties vvith the U.S.; partly because geography made it a natural partner of Europe but also because until the 1980's, vvhen mutual trade volumes increased and aid dependency vvas reduced, Turkey' s economic structure vvas not oriented tovvard international markcts.
Adding to that, the traditionally meager civil factors in Turkish politics, the bilateral relations vvere locked vvithin a context of "pure" politics. The lame economic leg of the relations limited Turkey's political options to bargaining solely över its assumed geopolitical situation and signifıcance.
Although stili ovving a lot to its strategical geography, Turkey has passed that rubicon vvhence its position on the vvorld map is its only measure of vvorthiness for the vvorld. As opposed to its role as geostrategically situated passive minör partner in an alliance of "developed" nations, vvith proper political management, Ankara can turn into an active economic, social, cultural, political and ideological link of the modern vvorld not only to the Mediterranean, but also to the "other vvorlds" in the periphery. Practically, the eastern and southern frontiers of Turkey constitute the physical boundary betvveen modernity and non-modernity: The "empire of evil" toppled to reveal a "boiling cauldron of evil"to the east and south of the Anatolian peninsula, a borderline of imminent threat to the West, or the Western style of life. In addition to the intricate machinations of Near Eastern politics, Caucasia is not much different from the Balkans of the early 20 th century; vvith hostilities raging betvveen and vvithin borders; religious or ethnic fundamentalism on universal rage; often precipitating violence and terrorism as the means of their proliferation. Thus, in this historio-geography, the eastern Mediterranean has acquired an even bigger signifıcance in the post Cold War era. Although unannounced and certainly not in those terms, novv the primary conflict is betvveen modernity and non-modernity. In eastern Mediterranean, in the post Cold War vvorld, the United States and Turkey share a broadcr range of interests, as their respective interests converge and arc accentuated on topics as, enhancing sharcd economic and trade relations, cooperating on global issues such as fundamcntalism and terrorism, regional isues relatcd to Iraq, Iran, Greece, the Caucasus, Caspian Sea oil, and Turkey's nevv military partnership vvith Israel. This layout points out to no significant change in the general geostrategy dependent relationship; except that Ankara has begun seeking an "enhanced partnership" vvith Washington, based on its ovvn sense of its importance for United States policies or strategies, vvhich Ankara feared vvas steadily diminishing at the end of the Cold War. The late President Turgut Özal joined the coalition formed to confront Iraq, hoping to convcrt a strategic partnership to a commercial traffic. This shook the dust off Turkey's traditional süper prudent foreign policy approach. Hovvever, although vvhat Özal had in mind vvas more economic gains through military inclusion, postÖzal activism vvas unadultcrated in its military and security objectives -though grovvn out of valid strategic concerns. Initiation of a diplomatic and military relationship vvith Israel is exemplary of a partnership vvhich grovvs out of both country's sense of isolation turning into activism.
Motivated by the preservation of its territorial integrity as vvell as traditionally Western oricntcd security conceptions, even before the Turkish-Syrian crisis of 1999, during vvhich its Moslem neighbors supported the latter, Turkey made its intentions clear and gave the signs that it vvill not object to a long dreamed of Washington project of an alliance that vvill contribute to stability in the region based on Turkey, Israel and vvishfully, Egypt and Jordan. Although clouded by its ovvn expectations and perceptions, in one aspect at least, Turkey's position refleets the modernist approach to security: If peace can be instituted and maintained, some prosperity ensues and socio-political turbulences of the periphery can be controlled through "near modern" buffer zones.
It has to be alvvays remembered that the West looks at a "premodern" world on its immediate periphery and contemplates the dilemma: How to maintain a vitally important geography reasonably peaceful, secure, but sealed so its populace will not "contaminate" the world with (unwanted) "premodernities". Therefore, independent of how badly local political authorities desire it or not, institution of peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean is in the global interests of the modem world, and in particular, the US. The Middle East Peace Process and the American diplomatic initiative to thaw the frozen "impasse" in Cyprus are indications of this deep rooted interest. The matter of concem for the regional parties is that, as long as it balances the strategic and political demands of the modern powers led by the US and is practical, workable and more importantly, applicable despite inevitable (maybe even violent) opposition, any resultant "solution" does not necessarily have to be equitable, fair, respectful to local imperatives or, if direly necessary, even the borders of "sovereign" states.
Turkey is lucky that the US shows considerable respect to its ally's sensitivity över territorial integrity. But, although ultimately refreshing, that in itself is not sufficient theoretical or practical basis for the policy of a regional power candidate like Turkey. The consolidation of Turkey's povver in the region, vvhich vvill be the most significant protective bulvvark modernity can design, cannot be complete vvithout an economic expansion and ideational component indispensable for leadership. So far, the emphasis vvas solely on military, security and political aspects of a TurcoAmerican partnership in the eastern Mediterranean vvhich nevertheless opens up vistas conducive for capital and trade cooperation. Indeed, Özal's gambit may have paid off, in January 1994, the Commerce Department included Turkey in a nevv approach to U.S. international trade relations vvith the "Big Emerging Markets" (BEM); a strategy involving countries that Washington believes vvill account for a majör sharc of the vvorld's economic grovvth över the next 15 years.
In recent years, hovvever, vvhat we are seeing in an intensifying arc of crises running from the Balkans, through Asia
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Minör to the Persian Gulf is that, Turkey stands under intensifying pressure from a number of quarters. Especially when the "containment policy of Iraq" by the U.S. and the U.K. formed into a "confrontation turned to conflict" in December 1998, vvith the Anglo-American bombing of Iraq, the long partnership has shovvn signs of stress. Remembering the enormous problems Turkey's support for the U.S.military during the Gulf War caused for Ankara, the Turkish public is sensitive to U.S. plans, to say the least. Ever since it began, the US-led "lovv-sanction, high-military, encourage-the-opposition strategy" tovvards Iraq has precipitated suspicions in Turkey, vvhich led to its criticism of the air vvar över Iraq and declaration that the American strike that disrupted a pipeline to Turkey vvas unacceptable. Even only this incident is a signal that Turkey's place in this dicey region necessitates the urgent need for an holistic implementation of security.
The corollary, then, that only through a holistic understanding of security, the Turco-American orientation seems to make its vvay to the inner core of global security. The "inner core" foresees a vvorld that is predictable, controllable, manageable and therefore safe and therefore free, i.e., vvhere no setbacks on the rule of modern democracy and economic liberalism are necessary or tolerated. This vvorld is one that can expect grovvth in every aspect of life in geometric proportions. Originally prepared as author's doctorate thesis, the revised book firmly embedded in Diplomatic History discipline, combining historical and international political dimensions. It is this feature of the book that provides us with the opportunity to make a comparative analysis betvveen the Ottoman Empire and the US of the 19 01 century.
BOOK REVIEWS
The author's basic thesis is that, in the 19 th century when the US povver vvas on the rise, the Ottoman Empire had already started its decline about a century ago. Thus, the disparity betvveen the povvers of an ascending and descending states should primarily be taken into account in order to understand the relations betvveen the tvvo countries.
The book comprise of three chapters. The first chapter deals vvith the establishment of the relations betvveen the tvvo countries (1776-1830). It tries the fınd out the historical roots of TurkishAmerican relations, through inquiries into vvhy the US had originally developed an interest tovvards Maghrib countries, such as Tripoli and Algeria, vvhich were under Ottoman rule as semiindependcnt areas. According to Erhan, this interest vvas mainly result of the US economic needs and policies; as a rising power US needed to expand its economic base with connections abroad.
Thus, when, in the first half of the 19 th century, the semiindependent Maghrib countries prevented US trade vvith the region, creating a deep impact for the American trade bourgeoisie, the US started to build its first deep sea armada to mount a successful military campaign against these countries. Erhan argues convincingly that this period of war, known as Barbary Wars, had an important place and impact on US history.
After the Barbary Wars, when the US navy secured Mediterranean for its trade routes, it tried to sign a trade agreement with the Ottoman Empire. Although, the Ottomans were not desirous to enter into an agreement with the US at the beginning, especially its military needs forced the Ottoman Empire to sign the 1830 Trade Agreement with the US. The agreement included a secret clause, a first for the US diplomacy, according to which the US accepted to sale war ships to the Ottoman Empire.
According to the author, Ottoman-American bilateral reilations entered the closest period of co-operation (1830-1867) follovving this agreement. Through the increase in economic relations, establishment of the diplomatic missions, arms sales from the US to the Ottoman Empire, and arrival of the Protestant missionaries to the Ottoman lands, the US diplomats established close relations vvith the Ottoman statcsmen. The cordial relationship vvas fostered as the US diplomats in İstanbul did not try to interfere in Empire's domestic problems and the Sublime Port vvas convinced that US did not have any secret ambition for the Ottoman lands.
As Erhan states, hovvever, although there vvere positive factors to further improve bilateral relations, the Sublime Port stili did not consider the US as one of the great povvers, such as Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Austria.
Despite developing relations, number of problems emerged towards the end of this era; US criticism about the legal status of the Straits, judicial and nationality problems of the US citizens vvho settled in Ottoman lands, missionary activities of US citizens, support of the Americans to Christian nations that rebelled against Ottoman rule. Although the US had not officially pursued a policy against the Ottoman Empire, emerging problems nevertheless started to affect bilateral relations.
The last era taken by the book covers from 1867 to 1917, vvhich is named by the author as the "Era of Eastern Question and the US". Ottoman-US relations got worse day-by-day during this period. The author connects the emerging US imperialism and its policy tovvards the Sublime Porte, in this era, as the US started to pursue imperialist policies and aimed to expand its economic, political and military influence around the world. This general tendency also affected its bilateral relations vvith the Ottoman Empire. Erhan argues that the US in this period not only supported Ottoman millets directly in their independence struggles, but the US missionaries too played an important role at the emergence of nationalism among various ethnic groups within the Empire. Erhan follows this pattern trough uprisings in Crete, Bulgaria and among the Armenian population. He also argues that the Ottoman policies against rcbel nations caused the Ottoman and Turkish image to be tainted in the US.
The book ends with Chester Project, which was the first direct investment attempt of the US capital into Anatolia, and with the ending of the diplomatic relations with the World War I.
While preparing this book, the author utilised historical documents extensively from US' National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), British Foreign Office and Ottoman Archives of the Prime Ministry. This strengthened objectivity and quality. But his preference or inevitability of not using the archives of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions stands out as the book's main defıciency, though he tried to compensate this deficiency by using memories of missionaries, visitors diaries and books that explain missionary activities in the Ottoman Empire.
With its simple language and user-friendly reading, the book would be of interest not only to experts of Turkish-American relations but also to students and even ordinary curious whose knowledge about the Turkish-American relations is limited. In this context, the usage of the visual materials, such as the historical documents that vvas utilised in the book, could have added significantly to book's appeal. Although Turkish-American relations after the World War II has become subject of many scholarly inquiries, the Ottoman-American relations has not received enough attention so far. Erhan's book is a strong step to fiil gap in this respect. 
Türk-Amerikan
İlişkileri is an over-size (24 cm) 408-page book, vvritten in single space, Times-Nevv Roman 12 points font, thus contains very detailed information on the subject. Dr. Uslu sustained great effort not to miss any single event in 50 years history of the bilateral relations. This concern, on the one hand, makes the book a reference source for Turkish-American relations, but on the other, creates difficulties to read it vvithin a theoretical context. In order to overcome these difficulties, Dr. Uslu added tvvo complimentary conceptual chapters into his book as an introductory to the history of the relations: "The Theoretical Base of Turkish-American Relations" and "Foreign Policy Formation in Turkey and the USA". In both chapters Dr. Uslu tries to ansvver basic questions such as, "In a small-big povver relationship vvhich side gets more benefits?"; "To vvhat extent can a big povver influence and change foreign policies, decisions and actions of its smaller ally and force it to act in a certain vvay?"; "To vvhat extent can a big povver influence national causes and internal policies of its smaller ally?"; "How does a small power act when it faces threats and pressures from its big ally?", ete.
Dr. Uslu, briefly explains Turkey's need for the American alliance after the Second World War by three factors: proteeting security, maintaining military and economic aid and strengthening westem-type state model (p. 17). (London, Frank Cass, 1981) lists Turkey as one of the weak states, and Dr. Uslu seems deeply influenced by Handel's views (pp. 29-33). Hovvever, Dr. Uslu's evaluation of Turkey as a small/vveak state is a highly questionable approach, as recent analyses of Turkey's position in the international system focus on "middle povver" or "medium power" term rather than "weak state" approach. While Handel names Turkey as a weak state by using criteria such as population, area, economy, national resources, military strength, William Hale and Baskın Oran fınd the term "medium power" more suitable by using the same criteria. Clearly, Dr. Uslu, also bears some concerns for determining Turkey's relations vvith the United States as "patron-client state relationship", as he affirms in p. 33 that, "it might be said that the US-Turkish relationship bore some characteristics of the patronclient relationship but not enough to fit this categorization. Especially, after 1965 it cannot be said that Turkey follovved US policy step by step. Nevertheless, the US vvas generally happy vvith the Turkish governments' general attitude until July 1975 vvhen the funetioning of US bases in Turkey vvas halted".
Michael Handel's book of Weak States of International System
As a point to appreciate, the author touches upon the development of foreign policy dccision-making processes of the US (pp. 67-79). For Turkish readers, topics such as effects of the public opinion, military, the Congress, the National Security Council on American foreign policy formation and philosophical Burcu Bostanoğlu's book on the politics of relations betvveen Turkey and the US, represents a substantially different outlook on the subject by analysing it through the perspective of critical theory.
The book devotes a huge part to the theoretical development of International Relations as a discipline of the social sciences. It begins vvith idealism and goes on vvith a lengthy criticism of positivism and its reflection in International Relations, the realist paradigm and modernism.
Bostanoğlu's vvork is important and a breakthrough among the vvorks on Turkish foreign policy in the sense that it tries to transcend the realist paradigm prevalent in Turkish foreign policy researches. More than being a study on Turkish foreign policy, the book is also a useful source for the study of International Relations theory since it spares around 200 pages for the theoretical arguments and it gives a general outline of US foreign policy in the 20 th century.
Bostanoğlu tries to analyse vvhat she calls "the politics of Turkish-American relations" by using the premises of critical theory. She argues that contrary to the narrovv povver-interest centred realist paradigm, vvith this approach the totality of relations could be encompassed. This unique endeavour itself is vvorthy of praise.
The author focuses on three cases, tvvo of vvhich are Turkey's paırticipation in the US-led war efforts (the Korean War and the Gnılf War) vvhere Turkey's policies converge vvith the US, and in orıe of them their policies divergc -the Cyprus question. Turkey's paırticipation in the Korean War, vvhich shovvs Ankara's desire to talte part in the Western vvorld and specifically in NATO, coincided vvith the establishment/strengthening of the US vvorld hegemony after the World War II. The second case study is the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 vvhere Turkey tried to consolidate its place vvithin the Western vvorld on the verge of the "Nevv World Order". And the third case is the Cyprus question, a point of contention betvveen Turkey and the US since the early 1960s.
After giving a detailed analysis of realism, neo-realism and critical thcory, the book offers the development of the concept of hegemony and pays special attention to the US hegemony and Turkey's place in US hegemonic vvorld order. In the book, the parallelism betvveen US foreign policy and the academic development of International Relations as a discipline is explicated succinctly.
It is the contention of the author that Turkey has taken part vvithin the US global hegemony by consent, in the Gramscian sense, used in International Relations by Robert Cox. Therefore, the tvvo of the three cases represents the "consent" vvhile the other one represents "coercion" (the arms embargo).
Rightfully, the author claims that the realist paradigm is part of the US academic/hegemonic tool and realist outlook to foreign policy constitutes the main pillar of US hegemonic practice.
Despite its novel approach to a very traditional subject, Bostanoğlu's vvork suffers from an important deficiency. Although the author takes up the subject from a critical theory perspeetive, vve do not see any elass-based analysis for explaining Turkish foreign policy in general and vis-â-vis the US specifically. Turkey, according to the author, tries to be part of the Westem vvorld, but this aspiration is taken for granted, vvithout probing and analysing the elass basis of such a policy. Bostanoğlu argues that Turkey joined the Korean War to gain membership in NATO, vvithout any pressure from the US, i.e., vvith "consent." It is surprising to see here that she follovvs the traditional-realist line of argument that the reason for Turkey's vvillingness to be a member of NATO is the rcsult of the "Turkey's fear of the Soviets and the Soviet demands on the Bosphorous and the Eastern provinces (pp. 337-338, 398) . It is argued that Turkey has been trying to be a Westernised country for tvvo centuries and Democrat Party vvanted Turkey to be a developed country, that Turkey vvanted to liberalise its economy vvith consent and in expectation of foreign aid (pp. 332, 338) , and that this policy contains sentimental overtones as vvell (p. 398).
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In a similar vein, the relationship betvveen the two countries are analysed at the governmental level. Bostanoğlu avoids to construct her analysis on the societal level although civil society is the main factor in forming the "consent" and this fact is indeed stressed by the author herself (p. 379). Bostanoğlu's explanation for this is "the lack of the participation of Turkish civil society in the US hegemonic world order" (p. 380). This puts aside the most crucial element of the critical theory perspective and the author simply ignores the role of the civil society in the analysis on the grounds that the participation of civil society in Turkey in the relationship is weak. In fact, there is a hugc literatüre on the role and development of civil society in Turkey and its influence on foreign policy such as Çağlar Keyder, Doğan Avcıoğlu and others. Especially important in this regard is the role of the burgeoning trading elass during the Second World War years. Though based on a more instrumentalist version of Marxian analysis Türkkaya Ataöv's early work on Turkish-American relations (.Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye, 1969) and Haluk Gerger's book on political-economy of Turkish foreign policy are good examples how this elass forced the government immediately after the war years to have eloser relations with the US and sought membership in NATO The second point that should be pointed out is the concept of (national) interest vvhich Bostanoğlu uses in the book vvithout giving any definition of it. It is interesting that the author severely criticises Turkish foreign policy because of its inefficiency in pursuing the national interest (p. 338), Turkey vvas unable to use the gains it could have achieved by using its geopolitical situation (p. 339) and Turkey vvas not strong enough in influencing the Turkic origin Caucasus and Central Asian republics (p. 340). With sentences like "Turkey is doomed to loose if it follovvs the same passive policy of 1950s in the 1990s" (p. 342), "...Turkey could not develop an aetive policy in line vvith its interests conceming the Cyprus issue" (p. 435), "Turkey, vvith its potential to be a regional povver, is a country that should have a more influential role on Baghdad" (p. 416); the author recommends policy options for the official foreign policy basing on the premises of the realist perspective.
In general, Bostanoğlu's book represents a fresh outlook to the foreign policy works and is stimulating for the new studies to come. This edited volume brings together a group of experts vvith varied backgrounds to provide an impressive collection mostly to the American audience. With their diverse backgrounds and vvellestablished credentials in government, journalism and academia, and with their knovvledge of Turkey and the Turkish language, the contributors are able to present lucid, well vvritten, easily digestible and argumentative chapters on post cold war Turkey and TurkishAmerican relations.
Certain individual chapters within the book are of high quality and offer significant insight into the nitty-gritty of different aspects of Turkish-American relations. Heath Lowry and Alan Makovksy especially provide useful perceptions into the past and the future of the relationship betvveen the two countries. Their balanced analyses of opportunities for improvement of this relationship and obstacles for further enhancement provide useful sobering vvamings as vvell as hope for the future of the relationship that 'has implications for American interests far beyond those of Soviet containment' (p. vi).
Even those contributions that leave the reader vvith a less satisfactory taste are vvell structured and professionally done. Their vveaknesses flovv mainly from the fact that their authors' primary * ilhan Uzgel is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University.
interest is not Turkish-American relations per se. The book vvas commissioned by an American foundation for the American audience vvith an intention to explain them the importance of Turkey for the American interests, vvithout much scholarly ccncern. The fact that three of the seven authors (Abramovvitz, Wilkonson and Makovsky) have vvorked or stili vvorking for the US government; one author (Çandar) is a journalist; and the main area of specialisation of the rest of the authors is not the TurkishAmerican relations (Öniş is an economist; Robins is an expert on Turkey's Middle Eastern policy and Lowry is an Ottoman historian), reflected in the book's occasional flavvs, vvhich are not many in any case.
Despite the individual quality of most of the chapters, the collection as a vvhole lacks a coherent framevvork and fails to be a comprehensive study of ali aspects of US-Turkish relations. While domestic aspects of both countries figüre predominantly on many chapters (chapters 2-6), only chaptcr seven deals vvith a third-party involvement to the smooth functioning of the relationship betvveen the tvvo countries. One expects to fınd additional chapters dealing vvith Turkish-American-Israeli triangle, or Turkish-US cooperation in the 'Caspian Games', though many authors take them up in passing. Also Öniş's chapter is a survey of Turkey's economic problems and hovv these are relevant to Turkish-US relations is not made clcar, except a rightful conclusion that there is a room for improvement (pp. 114-115) . Çandar, on the other hand, being an ardent supporter and sometimes advisor/originator of late president Özal's 'active foreign policy', cannot occasionally escape from partiality and a bias approach. Finally, despite an excellent Introduction and Overview by Morton Abramovvitz, the book needs a concluding chapter that could have summarized the fırıdings of the various chapters into a coherent vvhole to present guidelines for the future, though again many authors do that individually.
Another problem that bothers the reader is the result of the dynamism that overvvhelms Turkey specialist; Turkey is a country on the move and change in every aspect of the daily life from economics to foreign policy is an inescapable phenomenon. The authors of individual chapters of this book vvere also caught by this dynamism, thus detailed information are sometimes outdated (for
